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Abstract
Previous theoretical and empirical research has shown that policymakers
have an incentive to centralize government activities in order to weaken the
competitive pressure of fiscal federalism. We propose and test a positive
model of fiscal federalism in which centralization is less likely to occur where
budget referendums are possible. The reason for this result is that budget
referendums reduce the extent to which pro-centralization regions can
commit to a low level of spending delegating the centralization choice to
elected policymakers. In addition, it reduces the ability of higher level policy-
makers to attract additional responsibilities in order to gain policy discretion.
Empirical findings from a panel data analysis for Swiss cantons from 1980 to
1998 support this hypothesis
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There is a limit to the extent of country
 which can advantageously be governed,
 or even whose government can be conveniently
 superintended, from a single centre.
John Stuart Mill, 1861
I.  Introduction
A number of economists and political scientists have been concerned with the norma-
tive question of an optimally designed federalist constitution. In addition to arguments for a
vertical separation of powers, brought forward by Montesquieu and de Tocqueville, James
Madison already emphasized that a decentralized provision of public services best helps satis-
fying different needs arising from local or regional particularities: In Federalist 10, he con-
tended that the great and aggregate interests should be referred to the national, the local and in
particular to the state legislatures (HAMILTON, MADISON and JAY, 1787/88). OATES (1972, p.
11) argues that decentralization is appropriate if residents in different sub-federal jurisdictions
have different tastes for public services. A uniform provision of the service at the federal level
would leave both, the residents who want more of a public good and the residents who want
less of a public good, worse off. Consequently, he proposes his Decentralization Theorem as
a guideline for the distribution of fiscal competencies among different tiers of government: In
the absence of inter-jurisdictional externalities and economies of scale in the provision of
public services, decentralization of government activities is preferable.
The normative theory of fiscal federalism has developed conditions under which cen-
tralization of government activities or coordination among sub-federal governments are rea-
sonable. Interregional externalities in the form of cost or benefit spillovers provide arguments
for coordination activities. The larger distortions by regional externalities, the more useful
centralization may become. Similarly, tax competition may lead to fiscal externalities between
jurisdictions and provide reasons for centralization. In addition, economies of scale in the
consumption of public services can be exploited by a centralized provision. With respect to
income redistribution, centralization may be useful to circumvent income segregation between
sub-federal jurisdictions. If decentralized redistribution takes place and individuals are mo-
bile, the rich move to places where they pay low (progressive) income taxes while the poor
move to jurisdictions with high transfers. Finally, macroeconomic stabilization can be pro-
vided more effectively at the federal level. There are also theoretical arguments against each
of these reasons for centralization. For example, fiscal and regional externalities may offset- 3 -
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each other (SØRENSEN, 2000) or these externalities may be internalized by voluntary transfers
between jurisdictions (MYERS, 1990). The normative question to what extent government
services and tasks should be de-centralized is thus contested in the literature.
1
Recently, BESLEY and COATE (1999) challenged this welfare theoretical approach: In a
framework of benevolent governments that take different tastes of people in different juris-
dictions into account, a centralized system may allocate different levels of public goods to
different districts financed by general taxation as well as sub-federal governments can. But
unlike a decentralized decision-making process this centralized provision accompanied by
decentralized administration can internalize cross-border externalities. Therefore, decentrali-
zation of competencies cannot be explained by such normative arguments. It must be driven
by political economy considerations. In their framework, locally provided public goods are
selected by locally elected representatives. They therefore have incentives to equate the mar-
ginal benefits from the public good with the marginal costs of public funds. In a centralized
system, the level of local public goods is decided by the federal legislature consisting of
elected representatives from each district. This leads to a common pool problem of the public
budget: Each representative fully internalizes the benefit of the public good provided to his
own district, but as financing is shared through general taxes he internalizes only a fraction of
the marginal costs of public funds. Concentration of benefits and dispersion of costs lead to an
overspending problem.
2 Thus, the constitutional decision for or against centralizing public
goods entails a trade-off between the benefits of internalizing regional externalities and the
costs of a common pool problem that can best be solved by fiscal federalism.
Following WEINGAST, SHEPSLE and JOHNSON (1981), state and local policymakers
have an incentive to centralize government activities in order to provide their constituency
with geographically targeted public goods financing them nationally with general taxes. The
common-pool problem is aggravated by pork-barrel politics which can be achieved by vote
trading between policymakers of different jurisdictions (‘I’ll scratch your back, you’ll scratch
mine’).
3 Although federalist systems are desirable, they are therefore inherently unstable and
                                                          
1 The literature on the normative theory of fiscal federalism is large and still expanding. A brief summary of
the basic arguments is provided by FELD and SCHNEIDER (2001) while the classic articles on fiscal federalism
are collected in OATES (1998).
2 In a similar way, PERSSON and TABELLINI (1994) use a political economy analysis to show the importance of
decentralization in restricting government discretion to expand the public sector. For an analysis of this
common pool problem see the analysis of PERSSON and TABELLINI (2000), Chap. 7.
3 INMAN and RUBINFELD (1997) point to empirical evidence for the U.S. showing that legislatures usually
favor the high demanders of public goods under such a rule of universalism.- 4 -
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subject to secular trends towards centralization. This point is already mentioned by RIKER
(1964) and is empirically illustrated by VAUBEL (1994). BRENNAN and BUCHANAN (1980)
argue that the mentioned incentives for collusive agreements among politicians at the sub-
federal level weaken the competitive pressure of fiscal federalism and accordingly represent a
major problem of a federalist constitution.
Nevertheless, little attention is given to the positive question of how different degrees
of government centralization can be explained. Why do we observe different degrees of cen-
tralization in government activities? WALLIS and OATES (1988) explore the process of gov-
ernment centralization for U.S. state and local governments from 1902 to 1982. They investi-
gate various normative hypotheses concerning fiscal federalism but do not include a political
economy explanation of centralization. VAUBEL (1996) analyzes the impact of legal and con-
stitutional restrictions on government centralization for a cross-section of about 50 countries
in the early nineties and finds that the independence of constitutional (supreme) courts and
their age significantly reduces centralization. BLANKART (2000) argues in a comparative study
of Germany and Switzerland that the federal tax power is decisive for the unequal process of
government centralization in these two countries. He also discusses to what extent institu-
tional differences between both countries, for example the extent of direct democracy, may
shape the different centralization outcomes. He does however not provide any econometric
evidence.
In a convincing study, PANIZZA (1999) presents evidence that in about 60 countries the
level of democracy is associated with less centralized government activity.
4 The findings are
in line with ALESINA and SPOLAORE (1997) who theoretically show that democratization is
positively associated with the creation of countries. However, the democracy index used by
PANIZZA is not sufficiently differentiated and does not help to distinguish the impact of spe-
cific democratic instruments from each other. Moreover, these results do not appear to be ter-
ribly robust for different points in time and different specifications. In a further study, BAKER
(2000) takes a top-down perspective on centralization by having a look at the impact of cen-
tral authorities’ veto power. According to his results of a cross section of U.S. states in 1987,
governors in the states use enhanced veto authority to centralize local spending responsibili-
ties to the state level.
The purpose of this paper is to examine different degrees of centralization by political
economy considerations. In contrast to existing studies, our focus is on the relationship be-
tween fiscal referendums and the degree of budget centralization. If direct democratic deci-
                                                          
4 For an earlier study along these lines see POMMEREHNE and KIRCHGÄSSNER (1976).- 5 -
November 13, 2001
sion-making procedures, like referendums and initiatives, are used, an overspending problem
at the central level is less likely because vote trading is less probable. Citizens who decide on
the level of public goods in a referendum consider the total social costs of public funds and
not only a fraction of it, because citizens from the whole polity decide on spending issues and
not only those from a single district. The citizens from the districts that benefit each from lo-
cally concentrated public services can however not engage in region-wide vote trading with
other districts because of bargaining costs in large groups.
There is however an additional argument. In a citizen-candidate voting model, REDO-
ANO and SCHARF (2000) analyze policy centralization among two heterogeneous regions.
They argue that, even if centralization is preferable to internalize cross-border spillovers, a
referendum may prevent centralization from occurring. In the presence of a referendum, gov-
ernment policies are not harmonized whenever preferences for public goods’ provision differ
sufficiently among both regions. The pivotal voter in the jurisdiction that gains from benefit
spillovers will not accept the centralization proposal in the referendum. Delegating decision-
making power to elected representatives however helps the regions to obtain centralization
because delegating the harmonization choice commits the pro-centralization jurisdiction to
motivate the other jurisdiction to cooperate.
We test the hypothesis that referendums lead to less centralization with panel data
from the 26 Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998 with an econometric model capturing federalist
organization and including standard controls. Our empirical investigation supports the view
that popular referendums restrict government centralization. We find that budget referendums
are associated with a significantly lower level of spending and revenue centralization. This
does not only hold for total spending and revenue, but also for spending, revenue and tax
structure.
Our paper thus also contributes to the empirical literature on the political economy of
direct legislation. Several studies have investigated the effect of direct democratic institutions
on the performance of governments (see the reviews by FELD and KIRCHGÄSSNER, 2000 and
KIRCHGÄSSNER, FELD and SAVIOZ, 1999). A common finding is that institutions of direct de-
mocracy matter for government behavior. But to our knowledge, there is no empirical study
investigating the effect of budget referendums on government centralization.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we summarize the model of
REDOANO and SCHARF (2000) on the impact of referendums on government centralization and
adapt it by including an already existing central legislature. In Section III we present some
anecdotal evidence how referendums reduce the extent of centralization. In Section IV, styl-- 6 -
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ized facts of Swiss institutions are summarized to motivate the empirical analysis. The em-
pirical investigation appears in Section V followed by a discussion of the results in Section
VI. We offer some concluding remarks in Section VII.
II.  The Stability of (De-)Centralization: A Theoretical Framework
To show the theoretical effect of budget referendums in a similar setting as REDOANO
and SCHARF (RS subsequently), we use a simple spatial voting model adapted from MOSER
(1996), FELD (1997) and HUG and TSEBELIS (2001) as a working horse. The basic idea is to
show the effect of budget referendums on government centralization considering that state
decision-makers want to centralize government activities more than the median voter of the
aggregate of two heterogeneous regions, while the median voter of one of the regions prefers
a higher level of public goods than the median voter in the other region.
Following RS, we consider two local jurisdictions with identical population sizes.
Within each jurisdiction, individual income levels are assumed to be identical. Individuals in
each jurisdiction consume a private and a public good, the latter being financed exclusively by
a proportional income tax imposing a balanced budget requirement on both local jurisdictions.
Both jurisdictions have different preferences regarding consumption of private and public
goods. This preference heterogeneity is represented in Figure 1 in a two-dimensional policy
space where decision-makers are assumed to choose a public spending project (and its fi-
nancing) on the state or on the local governmental level. Suppose that state spending is repre-
sented on the x-axis and local spending on the y-axis. All political actors are assumed to have
Euclidean preferences with respect to expenditures E. The preference of a political actor i can
be represented by the utility function Vi(·) defined over E:
(1) . ) ˆ (
2 E E V i i − − =
The most preferred point by a political actor is called his ideal point,  i E ˆ , which has the
following property:  ) i ( E ˆ E ), E ( V ) E ˆ ( V i i i ≠ ∀ > . Thus, state and local decision-makers each
have ideal points in the space (LS and HS) which represent their preferences towards the allo-
cation between state and local spending (or revenue). All political actors are assumed to be
fully informed about the preferences of others and the structure of the game, and to prefer
their decisions not to be revised by others. On the basis of these assumptions, the concept of
sub-game perfect equilibrium is used providing a unique outcome for every budget game if
players do not prefer weakly dominated strategies, given the preferences of the actors, their- 7 -
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constitutionally assigned decision-making power and the sequence of the decision making
process.
Figure 1: The impact of referendums on the degree of centralization
The ideal points of policymakers in Figure 1 are associated with indifference circles
beyond which single actors would not approve any decision. We assume the basic situation of
two local jurisdictions that characterizes the RS model to be most easily represented by four
players. Consider first the situation described by RS for two heterogeneous jurisdictions that
are linked to each other by interjurisdictional externalities. Point LS is the ideal point of the
median voter of the jurisdiction with low level preferences of the state and local public goods.
Point HS is supposed to represent the preferences of the median voter in the jurisdiction with
the high level preference of state and local public goods with a slightly stronger taste for local
spending. Decentralized provision of the public good would imply different income tax rates
in accordance to the differences in spending levels. Centralization between both jurisdictions
implies that only one harmonized income tax rate is applied to the individuals in both regions
in order to finance a uniform level of the public good for both regions.
Under direct democracy, voters in both regions have to decide on the degree of cen-
tralization or coordination in a referendum in order to internalize interjurisdictional external-
ities. RS model this scenario as a three-stage game. Voters decide on centralization first, elect
their candidates in the second stage, and these representatives select policies in the third stage.
The spending preferences of the elected officials in the high spending preference jurisdiction










preference jurisdiction are depicted by point RLS. To illustrate the difference between direct
and representative democracy, we model the preferences of the elected representatives and the
median voters of both jurisdictions to be different from each other.
In the illustration drawn in Figure 1, the preferences of the median voters of both ju-
risdictions are sufficiently heterogeneous as to prevent centralization. This heterogeneity of
preferences prevents a coordination or centralization of public good provision, and is graphi-
cally represented by the fact that the indifference circles of the median voters of both jurisdic-
tions do not cross or touch each other. While the median voter represented by point HS prefers
a higher level of local spending, the median voter represented by point LS prefers a lower
level of local public spending. In a referendum democracy, the low preference region will not
agree on any deviation of local spending beyond the circle drawn around point LS if it is fully
autonomous over local spending under direct democracy. Voters in this jurisdiction will al-
ways vote against any such centralization effort for single policies as long as they can benefit
from spillover effects. The low preference jurisdiction can gain from such a non-cooperative
situation by a free ride on services from the other jurisdiction. On the other hand, the median
voter in the high spending preference jurisdiction will not approve any spending levels be-
yond the indifference circle drawn around HS, so that they cannot agree to lower spending
levels approaching the ideal point of the low spending region.
Under representative democracy, centralization does not trigger a referendum, but is
decided by the elected officials. RS show that the jurisdiction with a high preference for local
spending can successfully commit to the jurisdiction with a low preference for local spending
by electing a candidate with a lower preference for local spending than the median voter of
that jurisdiction (RHS). Since the indifference circle of that candidate is just crossing the bliss
point of the median voter in the high spending preference jurisdiction HS, the candidate wins
the election. The high preference jurisdiction has an interest in centralization because
interregional externalities makes the citizens worse off. Due to these externalities, the low
spending preference jurisdiction can free ride such that citizens in the high spending prefer-
ence jurisdiction incur a loss either because of congestion or inefficiently low provision of
public services. The election of a lower local spending preference representative by the con-
stituency of the high spending preference jurisdiction serves as a commitment device that the
spending preference of the low preference jurisdiction is sufficiently considered.
Similarly, the low preference jurisdiction can credibly commit itself by electing a can-
didate with higher spending preferences (RLS) signaling thus the competing region that its
higher public services will not be exploited by free riding. This candidate wins the election in- 9 -
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the low spending preference jurisdiction because the indifference circle drawn around RLS
crosses the ideal point of the median voter. The latter region has an incentive to commit to
higher spending levels because regional or fiscal externalities make it worse off as well if they
are not internalized. These externalities induce the region preferring high local spending to
provide public services on a too low level, perhaps even not at all. Like in a prisoners’ di-
lemma situation both regions are worse off in this uncooperative equilibrium. The low local
spending preference jurisdiction will suffer from the fact that the high spending region re-
duces its local spending level. Therefore it will take the opportunity to commit to cooperation
by delegating decision-making power to a candidate who prefers higher spending.
Having both candidates negotiate the extent of centralization and the level of spending
at the local level leads to a policy outcome somewhere in the overlapped lens, say Q. Both
officials decide to increase state spending and agree to harmonize their local spending. With-
out a referendum, this bargaining outcome becomes policy. In the presence of a referendum,
the median voter of the low preference jurisdiction would not accept such a proposal, but only
adopt combinations of state and local spending in the lens in the south-west of Q, that is de-
fined by the lines crossing points LS and RLS. The median voter of the high preference juris-
diction would only accept combinations of state and local spending in the lens in the north-
west of Q, that is defined by the lines crossing points HS and RHS. Since these areas do not
touch or cross each other, no centralization takes place under direct democracy.
These arguments can be interpreted as the interaction of two local jurisdictions which
create a new state authority by centralization. In the RS model, there are no political economy
problems in the sense discussed by BESLEY and COATE (1999). However, higher level
authorities usually exist already and have a vested interest in deriving additional policy re-
sponsibilities. Their interest for centralization can be deducted from the common pool prob-
lem emerging from centralization. Representatives at the central level are elected by each dis-
trict in a polity. In order to get benefits for their districts, each representative engages in a vote
trading exercise by promising the support of projects in other districts if the projects in his/her
district are supported by the other representatives. In this process, each representative fully
internalizes the benefit of its own public good, but as financing is shared through general
taxes it internalizes only a fraction of the marginal costs of public funds. Concentration of
benefits and dispersion of costs lead to an overspending problem.
To illustrate such a situation, suppose that centralization already occurred and the cur-
rent combination of state and local spending is depicted by point Q in Figure 1, now the ideal
point of the state authority. The deviation of Q from LS and HS can be explained by vote- 10 -
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trading of locally elected legislators. If the state authority has decision-making power on cen-
tralization, it will accept only proposals that are skewed towards state spending responsibili-
ties. The state authority will also veto any deviation from point Q, thus preventing decentrali-
zation. If, however, a binding and required referendum on this combination were possible, it
could change the outcome to a situation with a reduced share of state spending, as Q cannot
be attained under direct democracy. These arguments lead us to the following empirically
testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The degree of centralization is lower under a regime of
direct democracy, where a budget referendum is possible, than in a re-
gime where no budget referendum is available and budgetary deci-
sions are only taken by pure representative democracy.
III.  Anecdotal Evidence
As recent referendums on European integration in Ireland and Denmark have shown,
centralization is not easily accomplished in the case it has to be decided in a referendum. In a
referendum on joining the European Monetary Union on September 28, 2000, the Danish
people decided by a majority of 53.1 percent not to become a member of EMU although it is a
widely held belief that the de facto independence of Danish monetary policy is very little.
Danish voters obviously opposed a further centralization of competencies to the EU level.
Similarly, the Irish people did not adopt the Nice Treaty in a referendum on June 7, 2001 by a
majority of 53.9 percent. They may not have accepted that the Nice Treaty reduces the deci-
sion-making power of smaller EU member states in the Council of Ministers. Perhaps they
were also a bit embarrassed by the Commission’s intervention in Irish fiscal policies that oc-
curred despite the fact that Ireland has a favorable fiscal stance.
Government centralization is also of great practical relevance in Swiss politics, as two
examples illustrate: the canton of Fribourg which today accounts for 242 communes wants to
reduce its number of communes to 120 units by assisting communal mergers. The government
officials argue that the current communal structure is inefficient since one third of the com-
munes account for less than 1’000 inhabitants. In the sixties already the cantonal parliament
of Fribourg passed a law to encourage communal mergers, if necessary by enforcement. On a
referendum on May 26, 1974 voters refused this law by 60 percent of the votes. Nevertheless,
once more on October 12, 1999 the cantonal government of Fribourg decided to financially
subsidize communal mergers until 2004 with 4 Mio. SFr each year. After this date, mergers of
small communes should be enforced. Despite this incentive, the citizens strongly oppose these
plans.- 11 -
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The same holds for the canton of Ticino. In 1998 the cantonal government presented a
report arguing that its 245 communes are too small to provide public services efficiently. Ac-
cording to this report, the number of communes would have to be reduced to 86 units in order
to reach a so-called ‘optimal’ communal size. However, in a communal poll two communes
(Lugaggia and Sala Capriasca) refused the merger with 4 other communes. Another example
is a recent proposal on tax harmonization between all communes in the canton of Vaud. On
June 10, 2001, voters refused an initiative which demanded a uniform tax rate for all 384
communes on the territory of the canton of Vaud. These examples give a first clue that the
popular referendum could have some impact on restricting policy centralization among Swiss
cantons.
IV.  Stylized Facts about Swiss Institutions
Indeed, Switzerland provides a natural laboratory to test Hypothesis 1. The power of
the federal government in Switzerland is very limited. Federal tasks have to be explicitly
enumerated in the federal constitution. No concurrent legislation, like in Germany, exists and
centralization of responsibilities has to be approved in a referendum requiring a double ma-
jority of the Swiss citizens and of the cantonal electorates. In 1998, 33 percent of total (fed-
eral, cantonal and local) spending was undertaken by the federal government, 40 percent by
the cantonal level and 27 percent by the local level. There are corresponding figures for public
revenue. However, the degree of spending and revenue centralization is accompanied by a
respective decision-making power of the different government levels on spending and revenue
policies. For example, there is no tax sharing between Swiss jurisdictions, like in Australia,
Austria and Germany. Cantons and also local jurisdictions, though to a smaller extent, have
discretion on personal and corporate income tax rates (FELD and SCHNEIDER, 2001). Simi-
larly, cantons decide upon their infrastructure independently. Even social welfare is independ-
ently determined by the local and state levels.
As Appendix B illustrates, there is an additional variation of centralization from the lo-
cal to the state level in the different Swiss cantons. For total revenue and spending, it varies
from roughly 50 percent in cantons like Obwalden or Schwyz to essentially 100 percent in the
canton of Basle-City. The latter is an outlier in that respect, because cantonal and local
spending are not properly separated in the budget laws. The second most centralized canton is
the canton of Glarus. The degree of centralization varies even more considerably for different
revenue and spending categories. While the average centralization of direct taxes with the
exception of inheritance taxes appears to be relatively homogeneous, average centralization of- 12 -
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public spending categories is considerably more heterogeneous. It ranges from 8 percent to 98
percent in the case of spending for culture and recreation, but from 51 percent to 100 percent
in the case of education spending.





optional mandatory optional mandatory
ZH
c 2-20 20 0.2-2 2 4
BE 2 0.4 5
LU 3-25 25 specific stipulations
d 4.25
UR 0.5 1 0.05 0.1 5
SZ 0.25 0.05 4.38
OW 0.5 1 0.1 0.2 5
NW 0.25 5 0.05 0.5 5
GL 0.5 0.1 4
ZG 0.5 0.05 4
FR 0.25% 1% 0.25% 1% 2
SO 1-2 2 0.1-0.2 0.2 5
BS 1 0.2 4.25
BL 0.5 0.05 4.75
SH 0.3-1 0.3 0.05-0.1 0.05 4.5
AR 5% 1% 4
AI 0.25 0.5 0.05 0.1 3
SG 3.15 15 0.3-1.5 1.5 3.25
GR 1-5 5 0.3-0.5 0.5 4
AG 3 0.3 4.5
TG 1 3 0.2 0.6 4.5
TI 0.2 0.05 2.75
VD 3
VS 0.75% 0.25% 1
NE 1.5% 1.5% 1.5
GE 0.125 0.06 1
JU 0.5% 5% 0.05% 0.5% 2.5
Source: LUTZ, G. and D. STROHMANN (1998); and FREY, B.S. A. STUTZER (2000)
a The index is constructed by the signature requirement as the number of signatures relative to
the number of voters, by the legal time limit as the days within which the signatures have to
be collected and by the financial threshold as the per capita spending limit allowing for refer-
endum (the values correspond to the year 1992).
b In 1'000'000 Swiss Francs
c For an explanation of the identification codes cf. Figure 2
d In the case of recurring expenditures the total amount over all concerned budget periods is
decisive.- 13 -
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Figure 2: The budget referendum possibilities in Swiss Cantons
Figure 2 shows the extent of budget referendum possibilities in the 26 Swiss cantons. The
identification codes stand for the following cantons: Aargau (AG), Appenzell-Innerrhoden
(AI), Appenzell-Ausserrhoden (AR), Bern (BE), Basel-Landschaft (BL), Basel-Stadt (BS),
Fribourg (FR), Genève (GE), Glarus (GL), Graubünden (GR), Jura (JU), Luzern (LU),
Neuchâtel (NE), Nidwalden (NW), Obwalden (OW), Schaffhausen (SH), Schwyz (SZ),
St.Gallen (SG), Solothurn (SO), Thurgau (TG), Ticino (TI), Uri (UR), Vaud (VD), Valais
(VS), Zug (ZG), Zürich (ZH).
Switzerland’s considerable autonomy at the state and local level is accompanied by a
non-negligible variation of institutions of direct democracy. Most cantons have some form of
semi-direct democracy with a parliamentary system with legislators elected according to a
system of proportional party representation. Only two rural cantons (Appenzell-Innerrhoden
(AI) and Glarus (GL), cf. Figure 2) take political decisions in canton meetings (Landsge-
meinde). On the other hand, the cantons have different institutions of political participation
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ated by the voter initiative, and new laws passed by the legislature are, to different degrees,
subject to an optional or even a mandatory popular referendum.
In the context of our analysis, the impact of budget referendums on policy decisions of
sub-national governments is of interest. There exists no budget referendum on the central
level, but with the exception of the canton of Vaud (VD)
5 all cantons know a derivative of the
budget referendum. Of the remaining 25 cantons, 13 have a mandatory as well as an optional
budget referendum. In seven other cantons (BE, BS, BL, AG, TI, VS, GE) only the optional
budget referendum is possible, whereas in SZ, GL, ZG, AR, NE budget resolutions have to
pass the mandatory, but not the optional budget referendum. The budget referendum can be
differentiated according to five categories: the budget referendum for public expenditures, for
public-sector bonds, for taxes, for holdings on enterprises and for purchases of real estate. In
principle, there are threshold variations for non-recurring expenditures and for recurring ex-
penditures. Five cantons (FR, AR, VS, NE, JU) determine thresholds as a percentage of last
budget’s expenditures. All others determine a specific amount as the decisive threshold. The
number of signatures required to qualify for ballots and the time span within which the sig-
natures have to be collected for the optional budget referendum is also very diverse among
cantons. It differs from 0.49 percent of signatures from all voters in the canton of Obwalden
(OW) compared to 4.28 percent of signatures in the canton of Jura (JU). The time span for
collecting the signatures varies from 30 days to 90 days among cantons with an optional
budget referendum.
In order to conduct an empirical analysis, we calculate an index for the extent of fiscal
referendum possibilities across all Swiss cantons, similar to the one proposed by FREY and
STUTZER (2000). As can be seen from Figure 2 there is a wide cross-sectional variety in the
extent of referendum possibilities for fiscal matters in Switzerland. Thus, the institutional
variation on the Swiss sub-federal level provides a laboratory to investigate the impact of
budget referendums on government centralization.
V.  Empirical Model
In order to test Hypothesis 1, saying that budget referendums are associated with a
lower degree of government centralization, we use a linear model that determines the share of
cantonal expenditure and revenues (structure) from cantonal and local expenditure and reve-
nues (structure). The central level in our empirical model is therefore comprised of the can-
                                                          
5 Laws that affect public spending are subject to an optional legislative referendum in the canton of Vaud (VD).- 15 -
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tons while the sub-central level is represented by the local jurisdictions. The model can be
written as follows
(2) ESit = α 1 + β 1 Rit + γ 1 Tit + δ 1 Xit +ε 1it
(3) RSit = α 2  + β 2 Rit + γ 2 Tit + δ 2 Xit +ε 2it
where ESit denotes the share of real cantonal expenditure (structure) in percent of total
state and local expenditure in equation (2) and RSit represents the respective real revenues
(structure) in equation (3). Rit is the index for the extent of cantonal budget referendums, Tit is
a vector of different control variables measuring the extent of fiscal federalism, and Xit is a
vector of economic, demographic and political control variables. In addition, time fixed ef-
fects are included in all equations. α , β , γ , δ  are vector valued coefficients to be estimated
while ε  represents an error term (cf. Appendix A for a definition of all variables). The unit of
observation is the cantonal level. We estimate the model using annual data over the period
1980 to 1998 deflated to the year 1980. The subscript i = 1, ..., 26 indicates cantons and t =
1980, ..., 1998 indexes years (cf. Appendix B for summary statistics).
As stated by OATES (1972) and PANIZZA (1999) the quantification of government cen-
tralization is not an easy task. Cross-country comparisons of expenditure and revenue ratios
on the federal level could be an inaccurate measure of policy centralization due to the fol-
lowing problems: (i) Different numbers of levels of sub-federal governments should be
weighted differently. (ii) Local spending and revenues do not necessarily reflect autonomy in
spending and revenue decisions. (iii) The existence of inter-governmental grants has an im-
portant effect on the incentive structure of local decision-makers. Fortunately, our data base
accounts for these problems and therefore has a major advantage compared to cross-country
comparisons. First, all governments in our regression have only one sub-ordinate level. Sec-
ond, it may well be that centralization of public finances does not exactly describe local
autonomy and it would be better to have an indicator of constitutional autonomy. However,
the decision-making power granted to local jurisdictions by the cantonal constitution or the
laws is difficult to measure. In addition, Switzerland is one of the countries where the princi-
ple of institutional congruency holds, that is where people paying and consuming public
goods are also those who decide upon it (SCHALTEGGER and FREY, 2001). The Swiss data on
centralization of public finances should thus be a relatively good proxy for centralization of
competencies. Third, our data base allows to consider the impact of inter-governmental grants- 16 -
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in our analysis. Furthermore, a common problem of cross-country analyses stems from the
fact that social security programs are included in data for the total government but sometimes
not in data for the central government due to off-budget activities. Therefore, cross-country
centralization ratios are likely to be underestimated for those countries which have sizeable
off-budget activities. In our data base, the financing of national social security and national
defense are excluded for all governments. Thus, all in all we believe to have a useful proxy
reflecting government centralization.
6
To consider the institutional impact of budget referendums on government centraliza-
tion we use the index of cantonal budget referendums Rit, which is proposed by FREY and
STUTZER (2000). According to Hypothesis 1, this variable should exhibit a negative sign.
The theoretical model implies that the expenditure (revenue) structure is a function of
some internal determinants of a jurisdiction. First, the extent of fiscal federalism in the differ-
ent jurisdictions, measured by the vector Tit, plays an important role. According to the model
in Section 2, centralization depends on preference heterogeneity at the local level, the extent
of fiscal externalities due to tax competition and economies of scale in the provision of gov-
ernment services. We capture homogeneity in a canton by solely relying on income differ-
ences. The spread of personal income is measured by the ratio of real taxable income of the
median taxpayer to that of the average taxpayer. The stronger the homogeneity of a canton,
the more reasonable it is to centralize government policies because of low preference costs.
The closer the ideal points of the median voters in different local jurisdictions, the more easily
they can agree upon a uniform centralized provision of a public good.
A concurrent hypothesis with respect to that variable can be found in the normative
literature on fiscal federalism according to which decentralized income redistribution is not
possible due to income stratification (FELD and SCHNEIDER, 2001). The more uneven income
is distributed in a jurisdiction, the higher the necessity for a centralization of income redistri-
bution activities. The higher the ratio of median to mean income, the more even the income
distribution in a canton. Following the normative theory of fiscal federalism, higher income
differences are supposed to increase the pressure for centralization in particular with respect
to spending and revenue components which are strongly aimed at redistributing income, like
                                                          
6 An additional argument that is worth mentioning is concerned with a possible centralization to the federal
level. Indeed, economic and constitutional incentives to centralize government activities might also lead to a
centralization from the cantonal to the federal level and not only from the local to the cantonal level. This ef-
fect is not captured by the data used in this paper. It would be necessary to use cross country data that have
their particular shortcomings as well, as mentioned above.- 17 -
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e.g. (progressive) personal income taxes or welfare spending. The homogeneity variable thus
helps to find out the importance of both hypotheses. It is supposed to have a negative sign, if
the traditional public finance hypothesis on the impossibility of decentralized redistribution
holds. If the political economy argument holds, the homogeneity variable should have a posi-
tive sign.
Moreover, cantonal governments take fiscal policies of their neighbors into account
when making own decisions. This mimicking behavior of incumbents in a federalist system
may either be the result of a tax competition game between the different jurisdictions, and
thus their response to differential mobility of production factors (WILDASIN and WILSON,
2001). It may as well be a response of electoral voting behavior since voters make inter-
jurisdictional comparisons when making own decisions. Consequently, incumbents are en-
gaged in a kind of yardstick competition (BESLEY and CASE, 1995). The extent of tax or yard-
stick competition is taken into consideration by a weighted average of the tax burdens of all
other cantons for the highest income class. As weight, the inverse of geographical distance is
used.
Three other control variables for the extent of fiscal federalism are included. Popula-
tion and ratio of urban population capture economies of scale in consumption of publicly
provided goods. Following the argument by BRENNAN and BUCHANAN (1980), lump-sum
grants from the central level constitute an important resource for cantonal and local govern-
ments and therefore change the incentive structure of fiscal federalism.
In addition to variables of fiscal federalism, we include a vector of economic, demo-
graphic and political variables, Xit. The political control variables have to capture to what ex-
tent the common pool argument might influence centralization. ROUBINI and SACHS (1989)
argue that the broader a coalition the weaker its budgetary discipline due to the common pool
problem of the public budget. Broad-based coalition governments on the cantonal level could
have a tendency towards policy centralization in order to satisfy a broader range of different
constituencies. Therefore, a coalition variable is included, measured by the number of parties
in the cantonal cabinets. The severance of the common pool problem is mitigated by fiscal
federalism. The variable fragmentation (number of communes) incorporates the effect of the
number of local agents in explaining government centralization. The more local agents have
to agree on collusive agreements for policy centralization the less stable this agreement should
be. Thus, we expect a negative impact of fragmentation on policy centralization.- 18 -
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The remaining variables included in the model are standard controls. Following
WAGNER’S Law (1892) real national income per capita is used to quantify an income effect of
the demand for public goods. The different cultural background is considered by adding a
dummy-variable with respect to different language areas. With regard to different political
preferences we include the variable ideology that consists of an index within the range of 1 for
right wing dominated and 5 for left-wing dominated executive authority. Including these two
variables is important, because they indicate the preferences for government centralization in
the different Swiss cantons. It may be that the degree of centralization as well as the inclusion
of direct democratic decision-making rights in the cantonal constitutions are both determined
by a third variable. This third variable might be fiscal preferences of the citizens in the differ-
ent jurisdictions. In a recent paper, PUJOL and WEBER (2000) present evidence for Switzer-
land that fiscal preferences measured by budget referendums at the federal level are nearly
exclusively explained by the differences between the Swiss language areas. In addition, parti-
san considerations may play a role. Therefore, we have to include both variables in the model.
Finally, we include a dummy variable for the canton of Basle-City in the model in order to
consider the fact that state and local budgets are not properly distinguished in this canton.
In the spirit of other empirical investigations (e.g. FELD and KIRCHGÄSSNER, 2001) our
empirical analysis is performed using a pooled cross-sectional time-series (TSCS) model in-
cluding time fixed effects. Although (cross section or two way) fixed effects models may be
preferable as they provide useful information about the longitudinal relationship, they do not
seem to be appropriate in our case. They leave the explanation of cross-canton differences to
the cantonal intercepts without any theoretical foundations and therefore capture a major part
of the effect of budget referendums since institutions do not or only slightly fluctuate over
time. Thus, pooled models have to be applied with care but can be regarded as reasonable in
the field of institutionally oriented comparative political economy.
The estimation of equations of the spending and revenue structure raises some
econometric issues. Since the centralization ratios vary between zero and one and are there-
fore censored, OLS estimates would be biased. To take a possible bias into account, we use a
Tobit model with censored dependent variables. However, the assumption of normally dis-
tributed residuals is crucial for the consistency of the Tobit estimates. As can be seen by the
Jarque-Bera test in Tables 2 to 5 this condition is violated with respect to some estimates.
Thus, we conduct an analysis of outliers and control for the outliers by including dummy
variables for these observations. Comparing the estimation results with and without control-
ling for outliers indicates the extent of robustness of the estimates. In addition, panel data of-- 19 -
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ten exhibit cross-section heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Autocorrelation of the error
terms does however not affect the consistency of the estimated parameters, but only the con-
sistency of the estimated standard errors. Thus, we use a GMM method in order to compute
the z- or t-statistics.
Sometimes, budget referendums are seen as being endogenously influenced by budg-
etary parameters. We consider budget referendums as exogenous since they are characterized
by much stability over time. Finally, problems of endogeneity could be present for some other
regressors, too. To tackle this problem a Hausman-Test was performed. First, we regressed
grants and tax competition on their lagged values and the other regressors to obtain the re-
siduals. Then, the residuals are included in the original estimate. As the residuals are not
found to be significant in our regression we can be confident of their exogeneity.
VI.  Results
In Tables 2 to 5, we report the results of the econometric model. We first present evi-
dence on total spending and revenue as well as tax revenue. Second, we extend the analysis to
spending and revenue structure and finally we perform sensitivity analyses by including
dummy variables for university cantons and town meeting cantons. Note that the endogenous
variables, the ratios of cantonal to the sum of cantonal and local budget outcomes, take on
values between zero and one.
The regressions in Tables 2 to 5 indicate that the model performs relatively well in
statistical terms. Most variables are highly significant and their impact is robust to an analysis
of outliers. The Jarque-Bera test statistics in Table 2 indicate that the hypothesis of normality
can be rejected for total spending, total revenue and tax revenue. Since normal distribution of
the residuals is essential for the consistency of the estimated parameters in the Tobit model,
we concentrate our discussion of the results in all tables on the Tobit model in which outliers
are successfully controlled for. It is interesting to note that, in addition to the canton of Basle-
City, the cantons of Basle-Country, Uri and Glarus can be frequently identified as outliers.
Basle-Country and Glarus are known for traditionally high levels of centralization from the
local to the cantonal levels. Uri obtains high amounts of grants from the federal government
that the cantonal government administers.- 20 -
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Table 2: Tobit estimates for government centralization, general expenditure, revenue and tax
revenue, 26 Swiss cantons, 1980-1998
Variable
Expenditure I Expenditure II Revenue I Revenue II Tax revenue I Tax revenue II
-0.013*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.019*** -0.013*** Budget
referendum (-3.424) (-5.251) (-3.563) (-5.515) (-4.807) (-6.308)
Homogeneity 0.027 -0.041 0.014 -0.052 0.137*** -0.003
(0.549) (-1.128) (0.300) (-1.525) (2.655) (-0.112)
-0.321*** -0.176*** -0.322*** -0.181*** -0.691*** -0.349*** Tax
competition (-5.340) (-3.878) (-5.597) (-4.227) (-10.969) (-9.761)
0.079* 0.003 0.100** 0.022 -0.160*** -0.247*** Lump-sum grants
♥
(1.722) (0.115) (2.160) (0.703) (-3.323) (-9.372)
-0.156*** -0.122*** -0.171*** -0.138*** -0.063** 0.129*** Ratio of urban
population (-6.139) (-5.643) (-7.041) (-6.765) (-2.385) (7.616)
Population
 ♠ 0.158 0.278 0.188 0.306* -0.441* -0.550***
(0.671) (1.601) (0.837) (1.865) (-1.787) (-4.022)
Coalition 0.007 -0.016*** 0.006 -0.016*** 0.040*** -0.005
(1.462) (-4.061) (1.332) (-4.372) (7.975) (-1.499)
Fragmentation 
♥ -0.377*** -0.202*** -0.394*** -0.224*** -0.377*** -0.079**
(-6.783) (-4.897) (-7.401) (-5.745) (-6.464) (-2.427)
Ideology -0.031*** -0.017*** -0.031*** -0.016*** -0.045*** -0.031***
(-5.117) (-3.885) (-5.307) (-4.372) (-7.121) (-8.855)
Language -0.044*** -0.073*** -0.047*** -0.076*** 0.012 -0.041***
(-2.965) (-6.847) (-3.336) (-7.501) (0.755) (-4.815)
-0.208 0.002** -0.476 1.548** 3.558*** 3.078*** Cantonal
income 
♥ (-0.201) (2.490) (-0.481) (2.164) (3.283) (5.161)
0.442*** 0.454*** 0.454*** 0.466*** 0.401*** 0.365*** Dummy
Basel-Stadt (18.109) (24.922) (19.457) (27.096) (15.682) (25.420)
0.171*** 0.166*** 0.106*** Dummy
Basel-Land (12.257) (12.603) (9.646)
0.214*** 0.207*** 0.206*** Dummy Uri
(16.086) (16.488) (19.710)
0.122*** 0.119*** 0.361*** Dummy Glarus
(16.086) (8.245) (30.048)
Observations 494 494 494 494 494 494
Log likelihood 613.583 782.001 635.558 810.510 590.649 900.379
Jarque Bera 19.805*** 0.752 19.945*** 0.701 12.842*** 3.890
Note:
Government centralization stands for the state share of state and local expenditures. z-values are given in parenthe-
ses. The computed standard errors have been corrected for Newey West's heteroskedasticity and serial correlation
consistent covariance matrix. All regressions contain 19 year-dummies whose coefficients are not reported. ***,**
and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
♥ , 
♣ , 
♠ : scaled by 10^3, 10^5, 10^7, respec-
tively for readability. The Jarque-Bera test statistic is a test on the null hypothesis of normality of the residuals.Table 3: Tobit estimates for government centralization, expenditure structure, 26 Swiss cantons, 1980-1998
Variable
Administration Security Culture and
recreation Health Welfare Education Finance Traffic Economy Environment
0.003 -0.000 0.003 0.003 0.015*** -0.018*** 0.002 0.010** -0.006 -0.011*** Budget
referendum (0.809) (-0.989) (0.581) (0.365) (3.042) (-4.372) (0.227) (2.109) (-1.188) (-2.918)
Homogeneity -0.064 0.033 -0.199*** 0.138 0.044 0.190*** -0.318*** -0.114* -0.269*** 0.045
(-1.117) (0.692) (-2.898) (1.317) (0.677) (3.437) (-3.502) (-1.919) (-4.079) (0.881)
Tax competition -0.308*** 0.026 -0.009 -1.398*** -0.142* -0.388*** 0.994*** -0.319*** 0.342*** -0.258***
(-4.435) (0.455) (-0.104) (-9.867) (-1.797) (-4.543) (8.879) (-3.862) (3.605) (-3.435)
Lump-sum grants
♥ 0.135*** 0.125*** 0.456*** -0.300*** 0.014 0.148*** -0.251*** -0.094* 0.166** 0.528***
(2.604) (2.805) (7.303) (-3.000) (0.228) (2.707) (-2.913) (-1.691) (2.027) (8.995)
-0.227*** -0.080*** -0.447*** -1.060*** 0.033 -0.012 0.348*** -0.195*** 0.163*** 0.106** Ratio of urban
population (-8.252) (-3.280) (-12.051) (-15.939) (0.976) (-0.379) (7.346) (-5.611) (4.272) (2.556)
Population 
♠ 1.011*** -0.640*** 0.651** -0.373 -1.161*** 1.091*** -2.131*** 0.283 -0.845** -1.251***
(4.585) (-2.817) (1.976) (-0.670) (-3.755) (3.801) (-4.885) (1.009) (-2.324) (-4.376)
Coalition -0.018*** -0.007 0.043*** -0.010 -0.075*** 0.028*** -0.050*** -0.002 -0.025*** 0.018***
(-3.103) (-1.571) (6.061) (-0.983) (-11.830) (4.966) (-5.521) (-0.362) (-3.478) (2.829)
Fragmentation 
♥ -0.511*** -0.231*** 0.041 -1.511*** 0.265*** 0.378*** 0.156 -0.725*** 0.175** 0.322***
(-9.752) (-4.299) (0.546) (-12.211) (3.635) (5.029) (1.507) (-10.035) (1.997) (4.796)
Ideology -0.022*** -0.030*** 0.019** -0.157*** -0.012 0.028*** -0.050*** -0.002 0.013 0.008
(-3.461) (-5.106) (2.214) (-10.959) (-1.460) (4.966) (-5.521) (-0.362) (1.392) (1.067)
Language -0.063*** -0.048*** -0.043** 0.053 -0.217*** -0.100*** -0.062** -0.101*** -0.059*** 0.051***
(-4.641) (-3.340) (-2.062) (1.536) (-11.157) (-5.504) (-2.261) (-5.648) (-2.653) (2.790)
Cantonal income 
♥ 1.620 -1.261 -1.622 0.0177*** 1.579 0.606 0.206 -1.441 0.013 -3.861***
(1.422) (-1.262) (-1.149) (8.021) (1.164) (0.496) (0.107) (-1.142) (0.006) (-2.936)
0.611*** 0.319*** 0.966*** 0.596*** 0.391*** 0.422*** 0.099** 0.391*** 0.012 0.666*** Dummy
Basel-Stadt (29.791) (13.540) (27.790) (10.445) (12.202) (14.497) (2.189) (13.388) (0.275) (20.460)
Controlling outliers No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494
Log likelihood 554.650 630.852 454.383 253.968 479.685 558.819 312.237 532.376 481.328 592.426
Jarque-Bera 0.786 4.059 4.685* 1.969 1.986 3.674 3.633 4.114 3.686 4.551
Note:
Government centralization stands for the state share of state and local revenues. z-values are given in parentheses. All regressions contain 19 year-dummies whose coefficients are not
reported. ***,** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
♥ , 
♣ , 
♠ : scaled by 10^3, 10^5, 10^7, respectively for readability. The Jarque-Bera test statistic is a
test on the null hypothesis of normality of the residuals.- 22 -
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Table 4: Tobit estimates for government centralization, revenue structure, 26 Swiss cantons, 1980-1998
Variable
User Charges Tax on income and property Tax on property Tax on income Tax on profits Tax on capital
-0.023*** -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.010*** -0.033*** Budget
referendum (-4.201) (-6.009) (-9.643) (-10.905) (-4.148) (-8.156)
Homogeneity 0.106 -0.009 -0.011 0.003 0.016 0.221***
(1.594) (-0.293) (-0.493) (0.147) (0.532) (4.608)
Tax competition -0.342*** -0.377*** -0.548*** -0.534*** -0.496*** -0.741***
(-2.972) (-10.206) (-19.341) (-20.601) (-10.091) (-9.709)
Lump-sum grants
♥ -0.488*** -0.254*** -0.109*** -0.181*** -0.155*** -0.211***
(-5.613) (-9.339) (-5.171) (-9.565) (-5.539) (-4.967)
0.575*** 0.135*** 0.162*** 0.168*** 0.253*** -0.276*** Ratio of urban
population (13.384) (7.669) (11.821) (13.710) (11.817) (-7.253)
Population 
♠ -2.971*** -0.481*** -0.303** -0.380*** -0.831*** -4.841***
(-8.311) (-3.411) (-2.766) (-3.832) (-5.326) (10.141)
Coalition 0.038*** -0.006* -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.006* 0.074***
(4.527) (-1.930) (-4.535) (-4.899) (-1.916) (11.991)
Fragmentation 
♥ -0.488*** -0.089*** 0.001 -0.010 -0.161*** -0.982***
(-5.613) (-2.657) (0.044) (-0.443) (-4.752) (-11.012)
Ideology -0.125*** -0.031*** -0.023*** -0.021*** -0.049*** -0.022***
(-13.265) (-8.639) (-8.136) (-8.160) (-10.222) (-3.590)
Language 0.054** -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.061*** 0.007
(2.296) (-4.818) (-6.254) (-6.834) (-6.810) (0.379)
Cantonal income 
♥ 0.004** 0.003*** 3.482*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.010***
(2.500) (5.314) (7.352) (7.888) (2.835) (9.392)
0.111*** 0.382*** 0.443*** 0.369*** 0.370*** 0.461*** Dummy
Basel-Stadt (3.145) (25.472) (38.661) (35.508) (23.403) (21.019)
Controlling outliers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 494 494 494 494 494 494
Log likelihood 482.601 879.772 980.379 1062.932 871.415 613.876
Jarque-Bera 1.105 2.045 2.271 2.389 2.392 4.232
Note:
Government centralization stands for the state share of state and local revenues. z-values are given in parentheses. All regressions contain




scaled by 10^3, 10^5, 10^7, respectively for readability. The Jarque-Bera test statistic is a test on the null hypothesis of normality of the
residuals.Table 5: Sensitivity analysis, Tobit estimates for government centralization, 26 Swiss cantons, 1980-1998
Variable
Expenditure III Expenditure IV Revenue III Revenue IV Tax revenue III Tax revenue IV
-0.013*** -0.009*** -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.016*** -0.008** Budget
referendum (-5.769) (-3.696) (-6.434) (-4.254) (-4.476) (-2.237)
Homogeneity -0.046 -0.043 -0.052* -0.049* 0.136*** 0.125***
(-1.475) (-1.414) (-1.849) (-1.778) (2.908) (2.717)
Tax competition -0.511*** -0.530*** -0.532*** -0.552*** -0.926*** -0.885***
(-11.107) (-11.670) (-12.625) (13.278) (-14.918) (-14.475)
Lump-sum grants
♥ 0.111*** 0.097*** 0.137*** 0.125*** -0.008* -0.110**
(3.735) (3.332) (5.047) (4.678) (-1.838) (-2.511)
-0.292*** -0.300*** -0.297*** -0.304*** -0.153*** -0.118*** Ratio of urban
population (-13.098) (-13.633) (-14.585) (-15.164) (-5.906) (-4.501)
Population 
♣ -0.289* -0.228 -0.280** -0.224 -1.251*** -1.111***
(-1.875) (-1.498) (-1.995) (-1.619) (-5.224) (-4.745)
Coalition -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.0004 0.045*** 0.042***
(-0.634) (-0.227) (-0.310) (0.159) (9.576) (9.091)
Fragmentation 
♥ -0.359*** -0.332*** -0.376*** -0.349*** -0.471*** -0.396***
(-9.693) (-8.971) (-11.136) (-10.392) (-8.730) (-7.220)
Ideology -0.036*** -0.029*** -0.035*** -0.029*** -0.067*** -0.056***
(-8.773) (-6.982) (-9.451) (-7.559) (-10.844) (-8.610)
Language -0.029*** -0.039*** -0.027*** -0.036*** 0.047*** 0.023
(-2.944) (-3.950) (-2.997) (-4.023) (3.224) (1.536)
Cantonal income 
♥ 2.240*** 3.179*** 1.538*** 2.410*** 3.202*** 0.004***
(3.458) (4.721) (2.585) (3.917) (3.238) (4.060)
Dummy Basel-Stadt 0.472*** 0.473*** 0.480*** 0.481*** 0.385*** 0.377***
(30.253) (30.837) (33.724) (34.418) (16.490) (16.462)
0.113*** 0.114*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.113*** 0.100*** Dummy university
cantons (13.559) (13.836) (14.699) (15.030) (10.005) (8.829)
0.041*** 0.039*** 0.061*** Dummy
town-meeting (4.251) (4.458) (4.905)
Controlling outliers Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Observations 494 494 494 494 494 494
Log likelihood 860.153 869.026 902.585 912.326 636.554 647.970
Jarque-Bera 2.531 6.724** 3.554 4.925* 4.395 5.141*
For notes see Table 2.The results in Table 2 indicate that our theoretical considerations are confirmed for
total revenue, total spending and tax revenue. The index of fiscal referendums has the ex-
pected negative sign and is significant at the 1 percent level. The more cantons allow for fiscal
referendums in their constitutions, the less total spending, total revenue and tax revenue are
centralized to the cantonal level. Cantons with popular budget referendums transfer a broader
range of responsibilities to the local level compared to cantons where solely representatives
decide about policy centralization. Looking at total expenditure, total revenue and tax revenue
centralization, we thus find encouraging evidence supporting Hypothesis 1. The impact of the
fiscal referendum index on government centralization is robust to an analysis of outliers. Its
significance is increased when outliers are taken into account and the size of the coefficient
does not vary considerably. While the coefficients in Tobit models cannot be interpreted
quantitatively, its robustness nevertheless indicates that the inclusion or exclusion of outliers
does not alter the consistency of the estimated coefficients of fiscal referendums.
In addition to the Tobit model, we have performed Logit transformations of the cen-
tralization ratios and estimated the same model with this transformed dependent variable by
OLS in order to test whether the results are sensitive to the estimation method used. The re-
sults of this alternative estimation procedure, controlling for outliers, are presented in Table
A3 in Appendix C for government spending and in Table A4 for government revenue. The
results for centralization of total spending, total revenue and tax revenue in both tables con-
firm that of the Tobit model: Cantons with more influence of the people in a fiscal referendum
have a significantly lesser extent of centralization to the cantonal level.
The same result holds, to a lesser extent, with respect to the budgetary structure of
government activities, as the results in Tables 3 and A3 (controlling for outliers already) indi-
cate. On the expenditure side, budget referendums are associated with a significantly lower
centralization in the case of spending for the environment and education spending only. Cen-
tralization of administration, security, culture and recreation, health, finance and economy
expenditures are not significantly affected by fiscal referendums. Finally, public welfare and
traffic expenditure is more centralized in cantons that allow for fiscal referendums to a great
extent. The latter results are however not robust to the estimation procedure as Table A3
shows. Performing OLS regression with Logit transformed dependent variables renders most
of these impacts insignificant. There is only a significant negative impact of the fiscal refer-
endum on centralization of health and education spending. Since education spending reveals
the most robust relationship between the fiscal referendum index and centralization and is in- 25 -
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addition the most important spending category, it can be concluded that the strongest effect of
the fiscal referendum on centralization stems from its impact on education.
7
The results for the revenue structure in Table 4 (controlling for outliers) indicate that
cantons allowing for a great extent of fiscal referendums are less centralized on the cantonal
level as far as user charges and the different kinds of taxes are concerned. The index of fiscal
referendums has again the expected negative sign that is significant at the 1 percent level in
the case of (direct) taxes and user charges. Since the most important indirect taxes, the VAT
and the mineral oil tax, are in Switzerland in the power of the federal government, we cannot
say anything about centralization of indirect taxes. In addition, unimportant tax sources at the
Swiss sub-federal level like car and dogs taxes are not considered because they are usually
centralized to the cantonal level. Finally, inheritance taxes have to be taken out of account
because they are (nearly) pure cantonal taxes as well. The same negative and highly signifi-
cant impact of the index of fiscal referendum prevails however in the equations of centraliza-
tion of property, income, profit and capital taxes. In those cases, the fiscal referendum is asso-
ciated with less centralization to the cantonal level. All these results are very robust to an
analysis of outliers. The negative impact of fiscal referendums on centralization of taxes and
revenue is not affected by outliers. As Table A4 indicates, these results are also robust to the
estimation method used. With the exception of centralization of user charges, where it is sig-
nificant at the 5 percent level, the fiscal referendum index is significant on the 1 percent level
and has the expected negative sign in each equation. These results strongly support Hypothe-
sis 1.
The control variables for the extent of fiscal federalism exhibit an interesting pattern.
As the variable homogeneity suggests, the impact of income distribution in a canton only has
a significantly positive influence on government centralization for tax revenue (Table 2).
However, this impact is not robust including controls for outliers. In addition, as Tables 3 and
4 indicate, a higher income homogeneity is significantly associated with less centralization in
the case of culture and recreation, finance, traffic and economy spending, and with more cen-
tralization in the case of education expenditure and capital tax revenue. Of these results, only
centralization of culture and recreation spending is not robust to the estimation procedure
(Table A3 and A4). All in all, income homogeneity does therefore not have a consistent im-
pact on centralization of government activities in Switzerland. These results do neither
                                                          
7 Education spending covered about 22.8 percent of total cantonal and local spending followed by health
spending with 17.2 percent and welfare spending with 16.2 percent.- 26 -
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support the traditional tax competition hypothesis that decentralized redistribution is impossi-
ble, nor OATES’ (1972) argument that government activity can be centralized if tastes are ho-
mogeneous. On the other hand, the rather mixed results are not really surprising since impor-
tant programs of income redistribution like the federal income tax and social security are cen-
tralized to the federal level in Switzerland such that some arguments from the traditional the-
ory of public finance cannot be tested with the data used in this paper (FELD, 2000).
The coefficients of tax competition between Swiss cantons show that the better the
situation of a canton in the tax competition game, the more its government activities are de-
centralized. Put differently, the stronger tax competition among cantons is, in the sense that
the competing cantons set their tax rates relatively low as compared to the canton considered,
the more centralized taxes and, to a lesser extent, spending are to the cantonal level. This
holds for general revenue, tax revenue and general spending (Table 2). With respect to the
spending structure the proposed impact of tax competition holds especially for administration,
health, welfare, education, traffic and environmental spending whereas the results for the
other spending activities are mixed (Table 3). Using a different estimation procedure (Table
A3), these results remain relatively robust with respect to their statistical impact, except cen-
tralization of welfare, traffic and environment spending.
With respect to revenue structure, there is a robust, significant impact of tax competi-
tion on the centralization of user charges and the different kinds of tax revenue (Tables 4 and
A4). These results are robust to the consideration of outliers and to the use of a different esti-
mation procedure as well. The more the other cantons reduce their tax burden, the more taxes
are centralized to the cantonal level. According to FELD and KIRCHGÄSSNER (2001a) tax com-
petition is stronger at the Swiss local than at the cantonal level. The results obtained in this
paper are consistent with these earlier results on tax competition in Switzerland. Cantons with
a relatively bad situation in the tax competition game provide some relief for their communi-
ties by centralizing their taxes more strongly.
Economies of scale play a certain role in the centralization process at the Swiss canto-
nal level. The higher the share of urban population in the whole population, the less central-
ized total spending and total revenue, and the more centralized tax revenue (Table 2). This
does however not consistently hold for each spending and revenue category. Revenue from
user charges and nearly all tax revenue, except capital tax revenue, are more centralized the
higher the share of urban population (Table 4). This result is relatively robust to the estima-
tion procedure (Table A4). There is also significantly less centralization of administration,- 27 -
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security, culture and recreation, health and traffic spending, but more centralized finance
spending in urban cantons (Tables 3 and A3). Moreover, the population size of the canton
does not have a consistent impact on centralization.
From the remaining control variables, the coalition variable is particularly interesting.
The more parties are represented in the cantonal cabinets, the stronger spending and revenue
centralization are supposed to be. This result does however not consistently hold for several
spending and revenue categories. A significantly positive impact is observed for culture and
recreation, education and environment spending as well as user charges and capital taxes.
There is a robust, significantly negative impact however regarding centralization of revenue
from property and income taxes and of welfare spending. Total expenditure and revenue cen-
tralization is less pronounced in cantons with broader coalitions if outliers are successfully
controlled for. The impact of the coalition variable is thus neither homogeneous, nor uni-
formly pointing to the proposed direction. Although there is a significantly negative impact of
the variable ‘geographical fragmentation’ on centralization of total spending, total revenue
and tax revenue, the impact of geographical fragmentation is also not robust across different
spending and revenue categories. These very differentiated results depending on the spending
and revenue category may indicate a trade-off. On the one hand, the impossibility of exploit-
ing economies of scale in the consumption of publicly provided goods for small jurisdictions
forces cantons to centralize a comparably broader range of government activities. On the
other hand, a higher number of local incumbents restricts the stability of vote trading for col-
lusion among jurisdictions and therefore leads to less policy centralization.
Moreover, as predicted by BRENNAN and BUCHANAN (1980), grants-in-aid as an in-
strument for collusive agreements between governments weaken the power of fiscal federal-
ism. The empirical evidence partly supports this hypothesis in the Swiss case. The higher
lump sum grants, the more centralized are most spending categories (Tables 3 and A3), but the
less centralized are the different tax categories (Table 4 and A4). The remaining control vari-
ables, ideology, language and cantonal income exhibit consistent and clear-cut impacts on
centralization of different tax categories as well as general revenue.  While cantons with leftist
governments and German speaking cantons have less centralization, those with a higher in-
come per capita have more revenue centralization. The impact of these three variables on
centralization of spending and spending structure is however more ambiguous.
Finally, the sensitivity of these results is tested with the facts that only 10 Swiss can-
tons have a university, and that a specific form of direct democracy, a cantonal meeting simi-- 28 -
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lar to a town meeting, exists in some Swiss cantons. The first sensitivity test is motivated by
the result that the fiscal referendum index has a strong impact on education spending, which is
the most important spending category at the Swiss cantonal and local levels, but not on many
more spending categories. The fiscal referendum might perhaps be used more easily in can-
tons without a university, mistakenly indicating less centralization to the cantonal level in this
spending category as this is due to the cantonal university. Such a reasoning would also lead
to the conclusion that revenue should be more centralized in university cantons. On the other
hand, the town meeting cantons are special in many respects. This group is comprised of
some smaller mountainous cantons that may be able to centralize their public finances more
strongly due to a higher homogeneity of the population. Since the fiscal referendum is an in-
strument that is mainly used in cantons without a town-meeting-like cantonal organization of
direct democracy, the fiscal referendum index measures the wrong effect.
In order to test these arguments, the same Tobit estimations as in Table 2 are per-
formed and augmented by two dummy variables, the first taking on a value of one if a canton
has a university and zero otherwise, and the other taking on the value of one if a canton has a
town-meeting-like organization of direct democracy. The dummies are included in order to
check the sensitivity of the impact of the fiscal referendum index on the two mis-specification
arguments made above. Table 5 indicates the results of this test strategy first by including the
university canton dummy only and then adding the town meeting canton dummy as well.
Both variables are significant at the 1 percent level and have a positive sign. The im-
pact of the university canton dummy is not reduced if the town meeting canton is included as
well. The significantly positive impact of both variables on centralization of total spending,
total revenue and tax revenue corresponds to the conjecture that university cantons must have
a more centralized spending and revenue because the education service of the university and
the subsequent spending is performed by the cantonal level, and to the conjecture that the
small town meeting cantons have a higher centralization as well. Including the university
canton dummy alone does not have a notable impact on the influence of the fiscal referendum
index. It remains significant on the 1 percent level and the size and sign of the coefficient re-
main robust as well. Including the town meeting dummy in addition does not invalidate the
impact of the fiscal referendum index. It remains significant at the 1 percent level and keeps
the negative sign. The coefficient is however reduced. In the equations with the town meeting
dummy, the hypothesis of normal distribution of the residuals can be rejected. Controlling for
the additional outliers does not considerably change the influence of the fiscal referendum
dummy.- 29 -
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All in all, we thus find encouraging empirical results supporting our theoretical pre-
dictions that policy centralization is less likely when a budget referendum is available.
VII.  Conclusions
In this paper, the first empirical test is performed as to whether referendums prevent
centralization of government activity. On the basis of a model of REDOANO and SCHARF
(2000), we have shown that the degree of centralization is lower under direct than under rep-
resentative democracy if preferences in local jurisdictions are sufficiently heterogeneous. In
addition, referendums help to mitigate common pool problems as the costs emerging from
centralization. Based on the predictions of this model, we have conducted an econometric
analysis of the centralization of spending and revenue using panel data of Swiss cantons for
the period 1980 to 1998. Our results broadly support the hypothesis that budget referendums
restrict the ability to centralize government activities. This does not only hold with respect to
the centralization of revenue and spending in general, but also to several spending and reve-
nue categories. In addition to the referendum, fiscal federalism plays a role, although the im-
pact of different proxies for the extent of fiscal federalism is heterogeneous. For example the
less comfortable the position of a canton in the tax competition game with other cantons, the
more government activities are centralized to the cantonal level.
From a positive perspective, referendums are associated with less centralization of
government activities. This does however not imply any particular normative interpretation.
The model of RS used in this paper starts from the perspective that centralization is useful due
to inter-jurisdictional externalities (or economies of scale). We only use this model as a work-
horse without subscribing to its normative implications. That’s why we already slightly adapt
the model to the reasoning of BESLEY and COATE (1999) and PERSSON and TABELLINI (2000),
and add a common pool interpretation. In fact, centralization might be a consequence of po-
litical failure, if representatives at the central level have a vested interest in centralization to
obtain personal rents or securing re-election. Then referendums serve to safeguard the proper
interests of sub-ordinate jurisdictions.
The results in this paper do not help to solve this normative discussion. Given the re-
sults for the control variables, traditional fiscal federalism variables as well as proxies for the
severity of common pool problems play a certain role. The estimation methods used do not
allow to assess which variables have the quantitatively more important impact on centraliza-
tion of government activities. This has to be left for future research.- 30 -
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Appendix A
Table A1: Data description
Variable name Description Source
Structure of
Revenue share
Real total cantonal revenue per capita as a
share of real cantonal and local revenue per
capita.
Own calculations on the basis of the
Swiss Federal Finance Administration
Structure of
Expenditure share
Real total cantonal spending per capita as a
share of real cantonal and local spending per
capita.
Own calculations on the basis of the
Swiss Federal Finance and Tax Ad-
ministration
Homogeneity Ratio between the real personal income of the
median taxpayer compared to the average tax-
payer
Own calculations on the basis of the
Swiss Federal Tax Administration
Tax competition Weighted average of the tax burdens of all
other cantons for the highest income class;
Weight: Inverse of geographical distance.
Own calculations on the basis of data
from the Swiss Federal Tax Admini-
stration
Lump-sum grants Real federal lump-sum grants per capita Own calculations on the basis of the
Swiss Federal Finance Administration
Language Dummy=1 for German speaking cantons Own calculations
Fragmentation Number of communes in a canton Swiss Federal Statistical Office
Population Cantonal population Swiss Federal Statistical Office
Cantonal income Real cantonal income per capita Swiss Federal Finance Administration
Ratio of urban
population
Proportion of communes having more than
10'000 inhabitants.
Swiss Federal Statistical Office
Ideology Index between 1 (right) to 5 (left) that meas-
ures the relative strength of parties in govern-
ment with reference to the Left-Right dimen-
sion.
Own calculations on the basis of data
from the cantonal governments.
Budget Referendum Index designed to reflect the extent of budget
referendum possibilities within a range be-
tween 1 (lowest) and 6 (highest degree).
Own calculations for an index pro-
posed by Frey and Stutzer (2000) on
the basis of data from Trechsel and
Serdült (1999).
Coalition Number of parties in cabinet. Own calculations on the basis of data
from the cantonal governments.- 33 -
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Appendix B
Table A2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
General Revenue 67.0% 10.7% 50.5% 99.8%
User Charges 47.5% 22.4% 7.4% 99.2%
Tax Revenues 56.9% 13.2% 20.9% 97.7%
Tax on expenditure 97.0% 3.4% 76.1% 100%
Tax on income and property 54.7% 14.0% 24.6% 97.9%
Tax on property 51.4% 14.9% 18.7% 100%
Tax on income 51.1% 13.8% 26.4% 93.9%
Tax on profit 55.5% 17.7% 13.5% 100%
Tax on capital 55.1% 18.0% 19.8% 100%
Tax on inheritance 91.3% 0.2% 44.5% 100%
General Expenditure 66.9% 10.8% 51.0% 99.6%
Administration 49.0% 13.1% 26.2% 94.7%
Security 75.7% 11.1% 11.0% 99.9%
Culture and Recreation 34.7% 18.9% 8.0% 97.8%
Health 70.2% 24.8% 10.0% 100%
Public Welfare 73.1% 15.5% 39.8% 99.7%
Education 64.2% 18.1% 50.5% 99.7%
Finance 67.1% 17.5% 17.9% 99.9%
Traffic 69.5% 13.6% 33.5% 98.7%
Economy 84.0% 12.6% 42.9% 99.9%
Environment 35.0% 20.9% 7.2% 98.9%
Homogeneity 83.5% 7.3% 65.5% 99.7%
Tax competition 0.237 0.08 0.098 0.419
Lump-sum grants 1099 688 328 4152
Language 73.1% 44.4% 0.0% 100%
Fragmentation 115.5 113.9 3 412
Population 258’519 271’073 12’757 1'183’568
Ratio of urban population 30.6% 24.4% 0.0% 99.5%
Ideology 3.3 0.7 2 5
Budget Referendum 4.0 1.4 1.0 6.0
Cantonal income 25.9 5.8 17.7 54.0
Coalition 3.3 0.9 1 5
Note:
For a detailed description of the variables see Appendix A.
All statistics are computed for 494 observations.
The statistics for revenues, expenditure and lump-sum grants are measured in real terms per
capita.Appendix C
Table A3: Log-odds estimates for government centralization, expenditure structure, 26 Swiss cantons, 1980-1998
Total expenditure
Variable Admini-
stration Security Culture and
recreation Health Welfare Education Finance Traffic Economy Environment
-0.030** 0.005 0.010 0.007 -0.071** 0.033 -0.057*** 0.017 0.0002 -0.038 -0.032 Budget
referendum (-2.309) (0.350) (0.814) (0.343) (-2.360) (1.303) (-5.387) (0.623) (0.011) (-0.909) (-1.243)
Homogeneity -0.118 -0.095 0.102 -0.370 0.473** 0.065 0.232* -1.031*** -0.334* -1.201*** 0.031
(-0.856) (-0.571) (0.775) (-1.595) (2.147) (0.264) (1.655) (-3.134) (-1.656) (-2.963) (0.120)
Tax competition -0.452* -0.571** 0.883*** 0.135 -8.490*** -0.495 -1.440*** 0.882 -0.418 0.672 -0.105
(-1.932) (-2.205) (3.754) (0.430) (-10.389) (-1.266) (-5.122) (1.533) (-1.101) (0.886) (-0.233)
Lump-sum grants
♥ 0.026 0.249 0.497*** 0.891*** -0.401* -0.110 -0.247** 0.250 0.043 1.307*** 0.800***
(0.177) (1.428) (3.627) (3.477) (-1.884) (-0.475) (-2.022) (0.734) (0.145) (3.436) (3.089)
-0.226** -0.413*** -0.619*** -0.917*** -2.103*** 0.049 0.284** 0.839*** -0.449** 0.258 0.162 Ratio of urban
population (-2.435) (-4.025) (-6.711) (-6.545) (-6.277) (0.302) (2.154) (2.742) (-2.850) (0.959) (0.934)
Population
♠ -0.771 1.871** -0.714 0.834 -10.211*** -1.831* -0.023 -4.211** 1.161 -2.951 -2.101*
(1.056) (2.191) (-0.941) (0.713) (-5.189) (-1.740) (-0.021) (-2.356) (0.968) (-1.227) (-1.704)
Coalition -0.028 -0.035 -0.024* 0.081** 0.238*** -0.180*** 0.012 -0.003 0.011 -0.148*** -0.037
(-1.406) (-1.574) (-1.662) (2.891) (5.923) (-4.910) (0.677) (-0.065) (0.333) (-2.649) (-1.105)
Fragmentation
♥ -0.529** -0.914*** 0.361* 0.385 -2.980*** 0.375 0.704* -0.063 -1.528*** 0.648 0.002
(-2.516) (-4.645) (1.760) (1.371) (-5.498) (1.289) (1.943) (-0.136) (-4.899) (1.066) (0.006)
Ideology -0.0436** -0.038 0.0233 0.055* -0.062 -0.031 -0.031 0.015 -0.075*** 0.086 -0.058
(-2.107) (-1.628) (1.207) (1.853) (-1.112) (-0.842) (-1.186) (0.336) (-3.048) (1.584) (-1.417)
Language -0.139*** -0.108** -0.104** -0.076 1.655*** -0.579*** -0.087 0.076 -0.217** 0.153 0.019
(-3.114) (-2.206) (-2.192) (-1.060) (11.574) (-6.685) (-1.151) (0.520) (-2.284) (0.870) (0.196)
Cantonal income
♥ 3.138 2.951 -1.078 -1.537 11.892* 5.075 8.876** -20.567** -5.343 -7.684 -1.033
(1.011) (0.757) (-0.361) (-0.254) (1.827) (0.932) (2.585) (-2.443) (-0.848) (-0.858) (-0.146)
1.756*** 1.450*** 3.101*** 2.400*** 1.478*** 1.584*** 1.836*** 0.936*** 1.237*** 0.222 1.881*** Dummy
Basel-Stadt (13.700) (18.223) (43.392) (24.963) (6.931) (11.364) (22.836) (4.321) (10.559) (0.876) (10.954)
Controlling outliers Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494
R
2 adj. 0.880 0.732 0.926 0.793 0.945 0.704 0.915 0.501 0.696 0.362 0.779
Jarque-Bera 3.983 0.347 0.135 0.419 2.691 3.728 0.766 3.252 2.414 4.855* 3.857
Note: Government centralization stands for the state share of state and local revenues. t-values are given in parentheses. All regressions contain 19 year-dummies whose coefficients
are not reported. ***,** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
♥ , 
♣ , 
♠ : scaled by 10^3, 10^5, 10^7, respectively for readability. The Jarque-Bera test
statistic is a test on the null hypothesis of normality of the residuals.- 35 -
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Table A4: Log-odds estimates for government centralization, revenue structure, 26 Swiss cantons, 1980-1998
General revenue
Variable
Tax revenue User Charges Tax on income and property Tax on property Tax on income Tax on profits Tax on capital
-0.030** -0.025*** -0.053** -0.025*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.024*** -0.029*** Budget
referendum (-2.389) (-2.981) (-2.464) (-2.925) (-5.567) (-6.423) (-2.945) (-3.296)
Homogeneity -0.145 -0.022 0.279 -0.052 -0.012 0.002 0.065 0.217***
(-1.101) (-0.208) (1.028) (-0.472) (-0.171) (0.021) (0.777) (3.235)
Tax competition -0.457** -0.686*** -1.139* -0.731*** -1.015*** -0.984*** -0.876*** -0.820***
(-2.002) (-4.955) (-1.853) (-5.275) (-8.413) (-9.363) (-5.286) (-4.543)
Lump-sum grants
♥ 0.068 -0.456*** -1.518*** -0.458*** -0.234*** -0.343*** -0.346*** -0.232***
(0.494) (-5.737) (-5.967) (-5.537) (-4.550) (-6.260) (-4.477) (-3.223)
-0.259*** 0.249*** 1.243*** 0.268*** 0.337*** 0.322*** 0.517*** -0.306*** Ratio of urban
population (-2.957) (3.202) (4.495) (3.247) (5.123) (5.124) (5.197) (-3.851)
Population 
♠ 0.845 -0.937 -5.481*** -0.810 -0.682 -0.712* -1.691*** 5.011***
(1.215) (-1.431) (-2.806) (-1.221) (-1.540) (1.769) (-2.890) (4.874)
Coalition -0.029 -0.008 0.063* -0.011 -0.023** -0.021** -0.014 0.075***
(-1.507) (-0.560) (1.738) (-0.814) (-2.477) (-2.273) (-0.860) (6.265)
Fragmentation 
♥ -0.563*** -0.219 -1.244*** -0.228 -0.002 -0.042 -0.354** -1.071***
(-2.744) (-1.476) (-2.896) (-1.508) (-0.018) (-0.418) (-2.301) (-5.575)
Ideology -0.042** -0.063*** -0.263*** -0.063*** -0.046*** -0.040*** -0.099*** -0.023**
(-2.058) (-4.822) (-5.088) (-4.690) (-3.653) (-3.593) (-4.211) (-1.999)
Language -0.142*** -0.076*** 0.119 -0.076*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.110*** 0.003
(-3.496) (-2.867) (0.944) (-2.698) (-3.028) (-3.472) (-3.937) (0.084)
Cantonal income 
♥ 2.444 0.006** 11.501 5.687** 6.515*** 6.138*** 3.891 9.865***
(0.800) (2.435) (1.361) (2.322) (3.970) (3.555) (1.435) (4.957)
1.762*** 1.320*** 0.737*** 1.380*** 8.869*** 0.984*** 2.000*** 0.469*** Dummy
Basel-Stadt (13.693) (27.694) (4.000) (27.611) (235.081) (26.809) (32.644) (10.626)
Controlling outliers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494
R
2 adj. 0.887 0.950 0.835 0.950 0.999 0.965 0.998 0.855
Jarque-Bera 4.450 2.014 1.505 4.544 2.084 2.801 2.331 4.436
Note:
Government centralization stands for the state share of state and local revenues. t-values are given in parentheses. All regressions contain 19 year-dummies whose coeffi-
cients are not reported. ***,** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
♥ , 
♣ , 
♠ : scaled by 10^3, 10^5, 10^7, respectively for readability. The
Jarque-Bera test statistic is a test on the null hypothesis of normality of the residuals.